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1. Introduction
Compared to wage work, self-employment is a fundamentally di¤erent occupation with
respect to the type and source of income. While wage workers receive a wage which
is subject to a relatively small level of uncertainty, self-employed individuals often face
considerably more variation in their income. Moreover, since self-employed typically use
own wealth to nance their business, they bear the risk associated with starting up the
rm. Therefore, the expected income and the uncertainty of this income are likely to be
important determinants of an individuals occupational choice.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the occupa-
tional choice and the distributions of associated monetary gains in di¤erent occupations.
Specically, we analyze how existing earnings di¤erentials and di¤erences in income un-
certainty can explain observed occupational choices. A particular focus is on explaining
why fewer women choose to become self-employed.
If individuals are risk averse, we would expect that the self-employed should be com-
pensated for facing higher income uncertainty. However, earnings-di¤erentials may arise
for other reasons than risk compensation: Hamilton (2000) argues that cross-sectional
earnings di¤erentials may arise due to i) di¤erent earnings-experience proles, ii) self-
selection, and iii) non-pecuniary benets. Hamilton nds that mean and median incomes
are lower in self-employment than in wage-employment in the US, although those in the
higher income brackets earn more in self-employment than in wage-employment. Hamil-
ton concludes that individuals choose self-employment primarily because of non-pecuniary
benets.
An alternative (or complementary) explanation is that those who choose to become
self-employed may be less risk-averse than the typical wage employed. They may even
be risk-lovers. In a recent paper by Elston, Harrison, and Rutström (2006), experiments
are used to characterize the attitudes to risk among entrepreneurs. Their main nding
is that full-time entrepreneurs are less risk-averse and exhibit a signicant joy of winning
compared to non-entrepreneurs and part-time entrepreneurs.
Yet another explanation relates to the individuals subjective assessment of the proba-
bility of success. While Coelho and de Meza (2006) provide experimental evidence that
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entrepreneurs tend to overestimate their chance of success, Elston, Harrison, and Rut-
ström (2006) do not nd systematic judgmental error of protability. However, it is
found that part-time entrepreneurs are reluctant to enter markets where protability is
based on their perception of their relative skill ability.
Evidence from existing Danish questionnaire surveys shows that men focus more on the
expected income level than women when choosing occupation, whereas women emphasize
non-pecuniary benets (Statistics Denmark, 1999; and Kjeldsen and Nielsen, 2000). Thus,
90 per cent of the women who had a child in the age of 0-2 years at the time of the business
start-up state that an important reason for becoming self-employed was to make it easier
to combine family life and work.
With respect to risk aversion, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) analyze 150 psycho-
logical studies of risk-taking behavior, and nd that in 14 out of 16 tasks, women are more
risk-averse. However, according to Croson and Gneezy (2004) the evidence of women be-
ing more risk-averse is less clear in the economics literature which has typically focused
on nancial risk.
Several studies have suggested that overcondence is part of human nature, e.g. Sven-
son (1980) reports that 90 per cent of Swedish drivers rate themselves above average.
Recently and in relation to occupational choice, Niederle and Vesterlund (2006) nd from
the conduction of experiments that more women than men prefer to work under a non-
competitive piece-rate compensation system rather than under a competitive tournament
compensation scheme even though women are found to be as productive as men. Niederle
and Vesterlund (2006) conclude that the reason for this di¤erence is that men are too
overcondent and enjoy competition more. In other words, too many low productivity
men enter the competitive tournament, while productive women do not enter enough.
To evaluate whether the self-employed actually are compensated for their risk-taking,
individual level information about the expected income (and the expected distribution
of income) in both self-employment and wage-employment is required. To obtain this
information, we estimate earnings functions for self-employed and wage-employed sep-
arately. However, individuals would be expected to select themselves into the type of
occupation where they are most productive. Therefore, we estimate earnings functions
for each occupational choice, using the dynamic panel data sample selection model of
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Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999). This also allows us to disentangle the role of unobserved
heterogeneity and state dependence in the occupational choices. We nd evidence of state
dependence in the occupational choices.
The estimated earnings functions are then in turn used to predict an individuals income
(and the uncertainty of this income) in di¤erent occupations. The random components of
the model are partitioned into transitory and permanent shocks, which in turn are used
to create occupational and education specic measures of income variance (uncertainty)
and skewness (the risk/chance of very low/high incomes).
Rather that rather than characterizing the entrepreneur, we directly evaluate the impact
of earnings on the choice of becoming self-employed, wage-employed or unemployed by
examining the roles of expected earnings, risk aversion and over-condence. This is done
for each gender separately. Our results complement existing evidence from experimental
economics, providing an potential explanations for the substantial gender gap in the
probability of choosing to become self-employed.
We use a large longitudinal data set based on Danish register data from 1980 to 1996,
providing us with detailed individual information about income, wealth, education, labor
market status (occupation), region of residence, and immigration status. Since the panel
covers more than 15 years, we can track long sequences of individual occupational choices
and, thereby, appropriately investigate the dynamics of the self-employment choice.
Our results point to a large role for monetary aspects when choosing occupation. As
expected, people prefer the sector with the highest expected income and lowest expected
variance and, thus, on average appear risk-averse. We nd that men put more emphasis on
the earnings level, while women appear more risk-averse, which could be one of the crucial
reasons why fewer women are self-employed. We do not nd evidence of overcondence.
If anything, women instead seem to under-estimate their chance of success compared to
men.
The explanatory power of the occupational choice model is quite impressive considering
that we only include the predicted income level, variance and skewness. However, we
explain much less of the variation in the realized occupational choices for the group of non-
western immigrants. Immigrants are interesting with respect to occupational choice since
they are more likely to start up their own business than natives. We nd that immigrants
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put much less emphasis on the earnings level. These ndings provide additional evidence
for immigrants being marginalized into self-employment as Blume, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and
Würtz (2005) suggest. From their analysis on Danish transition data it is found that
most non-western immigrants entering self-employment come from unemployment and
that they do not use self-employment as a stepping stone for becoming wage-employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the data used
in the analysis. In section 3 we formulate the econometric specication. In section 4, we
present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
The data we use in this paper is an unbalanced panel data set for 1980-1996. The data
is a representative 10 per cent sample extract drawn from the Integrated Database for
labor market Research (IDA) and the Danish Income Registry (IKR) both maintained by
Statistics Denmark. IDA and IKR are both longitudinal data based on register data for
all individuals in Denmark. Since data originates from administrative records covering
the entire Danish population there is only natural attrition in the data, i.e. birth, death
and migration of individuals. The occupational status is observed once a year (the last
week of November). We divide the labor market status into three states; self-employed,
wage-employed, and unemployed. Since the panel covers more than 15 years, we have
the possibility to track individuals over long time periods (before, during and after self-
employment) and, thereby, appropriately control for the dynamics of the occupational
choice. These high-quality Danish data contains very detailed individual information
concerning, e.g., income, wealth, education, labor market status, region of residence, and
immigration status. Moreover, the data also includes the same information for cohabitants
allowing us to aggregate variables to the household level.
In order to avoid distortions in the results due to retirement patterns and educational
attainment we restrict the sample to include persons aged 30-55 years only. This leaves
us with 2; 424; 694 observations in total of which 1; 130; 635 are women.
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For the analysis of occupational choice we need to decide on an income measure to
use. One obvious candidate is disposable income since this measure is closely related to
current consumption possibilities and, hence, utility.1
<< Figure 1 about here >>
<< Table 1 about here >>
Figure 1 shows kernel densities for the disposable income for self-employed and for wage-
employed in 1996. Both distributions are right-skewed with the distribution of incomes
from self-employed being most right skewed. From both Figure 1 and Table 1 it can be
seen that the mean disposable income for self-employed is considerably below the mean
income for wage-employed. However, due to the skewness the 90th percentile earns more
in self-employment than the equivalent in wage-employment.
Figure 1 and Table 1 conrm the US evidence presented in Hamilton (2000), who also
nds that mean and median incomes are lower in self-employment, but that those in the
higher percentiles earn more in self-employment relative to wage-employment.
In Figure 2 we have depicted the (taxable) personal income for respectively wage-
employed and self-employed together with two dotted vertical lines indicating where the
medium and upper tax brackets set in. In contrast to wage-employed, self-employed tend
to bunch just below where the tax brackets set in. This can be due to self-employed
being in charge of their own working time, but it may also reect that self-employed are
building up inventories and capital stocks or have other means of extracting income from
their rm (possibly also in the grey area between rm economics and personal economics).
Finally, an institutional feature ("Virksomhedsordningen") allows self-employed to retain
earnings in the rm.
1We compute the gross income including wage-income, capital income, labor market contributions
(since 1994), taxable and non-taxable benets. In order to obtain the disposable income we subtract the
tax payments.
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<< Figure 2 about here >>
The bunching at the tax brackets suggests that adding retained earnings (less of taxes)
to the disposable income constitutes a better income measure for self-employed and we
only use this income measure in the rest of the paper. As shown in Figure 3 we nd
that the unconditional mean and median incomes are larger in self-employment than in
wage-employment in contrast to the US evidence in Hamilton (2000) and in contrast to
when applying the narrow income measure.
<< Figure 3 about here >>
3. Econometric Specification
The organization of this section, can be summarized as follows: First, we consider the
estimation of conditional earnings functions using Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) sample
selection model for panel data. Hereafter, we construct income uncertainty and skewness
measures. Finally, using measures for expected income, uncertainty and skewness, we
model the occupational choice in a conditional logit model.
3.1. Earnings Conditional on Occupational Choice. For each person we separately
predict the disposable income including retained earnings from being self-employed and
being wage employed. The chosen income measure is disposable income including re-
tained earnings. We use unemployment benets for the group of unemployed. For each
occupation we model earnings as a simple log-linear mincer earnings equation
(3.1) ln ynt = xnt + n + "nt
where n indexes individuals (n = 1; ::; N) and t indexes time (t = 1; ::::; T ); ynt is annual
disposable income plus retained earnings,  is a vector of unknown coe¢ cients to be
estimated, xnt is a vector covariates, n represents unobserved heterogeneity and "nt is a
normally distributed disturbance.
Since we observe earnings for the chosen occupational status only, the conditional earn-
ings functions will in general be estimated on a non-random selected sample. There are
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several arguments, why self-selection may be an issue in the present context. In the Roy
(1951) model the individual ex-ante knows her sector-specic productivity, and will select
herself into the sector, where she is most productive. Furthermore, if the incomes in the
two sectors are highly correlated, the most productive persons will select the sector with
the largest dispersion of sector specic abilities, while the least productive will select the
sector with the smallest dispersion.
The Danish labor market is characterized by a compressed wage structure as a con-
sequence of the generous unemployment benet level and a high degree of organization
on both employer and worker sides. As argued by Malchow-Møller, Markusen, and Skak-
sen (2006) such institutional arrangement may well imply that the most productive are
not paid according to their marginal product and, therefore, the most able may select
themselves into self-employment. On the other hand, the least productive may not have
a su¢ ciently high productivity to earn the minimum wage in paid employment. Conse-
quently, marginalization may also push the least productive into self-employment. Blume,
Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz (2005) argue that this indeed is the case for non-western im-
migrants in the Danish labor market.
Yet another type of selection, ex-post self-selection, arises in leaning models such as
Jovanovic (1979) and Jovanovic (1984), where persons have no ex-ante knowledge of their
productivity, but consecutively observe output realizations. Persons experiencing poor
output realizations will quit and search for a new match.
To control for the selection problem we use the Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999) dynamic
panel data application of Heckmans two-step sample selection model. The selection is
modelled as a dynamic random e¤ects probit, which allows us to separate two sources of
persistence in the occupational choice: Persistence as a result of unobserved heterogeneity
and (true) state dependence. Since we do not observe the rst occupational choice, we
cannot assume that the initial observation of the occupational is truly exogenous. We use
the Wooldridge (2005) way of handling the initial conditions problem and, thus, allow the
unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the initial dependent variable.
We will now briey explain the model.2 We consider a model consisting of two equations,
where the parameters of equation (3.1) are of primary interest, while the selection equation
2For a detailed treatment of the model see Vella and Verbeek (1999).
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below is a reduced form equation for the occupational choice. The selection part of the
model can be summarized as
dnt = xnt + dnt 1 + n + nt(3.2)
dnt = 1 (d

nt > 0)(3.3)
ln ynt = ln y

nt if dnt = 1(3.4)
= 0 (unobserved) otherwise
where ynt and d

nt are latent endogenous variables with observed counterparts ynt and dnt.
The equation of interest is assumed to have the usual error component structure, where
n  iN (0; 2) and "nt  iN (0; 2"). For the selection equation we allow for unobserved
heterogeneity through random individual e¤ects, such that the selection equation has
the following two-component error structure n  iN
 
0; 2

and nt  iN
 
0; 2

. We
allow for correlation between the individual e¤ects as well as correlation between the
idiosyncratic disturbances, that is cov(n; n) =  6= 0 and cov("nt; nt) = " 6= 0.
Finally, denote nt = n + "nt , nt = n + nt , xn = [xn1; :::; xnT ]
0 and let n be a T
vector of nt:
Assume now
njxn  iN
 
0; 2ii
0 + 2I

(3.5)
E [ntjxn; n] =  1nt +  2n(3.6)
where n = T 1
PT
t=1 nt and where  1 = "=
2
" and  2 = T
 
   "2=2"

=
 
2 + T
2


are constants to be estimated and i is a column of ones. Note that equation (3.6) imposes
strict exogeneity of xnt, such that errors are assumed to be independent of future and
lagged values of xnt. To estimate the conditional mean for the dependent variable in the
equation of interest, we condition on the chosen occupation
E [ln yntjxn; dn0; dn] = xnt + E [ntjxn; dn0; dn]
where E [ntjxn; dn0; dn] is the selection bias induced by correlation between the errors in
the two equations.
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Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the conditional mean of the error-term
from the selection equation; E [ntjxn; dn0; dn] can be estimated by the following expression
(3.7) ~nt =
1R
f (dnjxn; n) f (n) dn
Z
(n + E [ntjxn; n]) f (dnjxn; n) f (n) dn
This expression can be approximated by quadrature methods or simulation. Once we have
estimated the reduced form parameters for the selection equation, we can easily simulate
the conditional error ~nt.3
After computing ~nt and the individual specic means n = 1Tn
PTn
t ~nt we can estimate
the following equation by the simple linear random e¤ects model
ln ynt = xnt + ~nt1 + n2 + n + "nt
3.2. Uncertainty and Skewness Measures. For each category in our disaggregated
education breakdown shown in Table A.1 we estimate the occupational-specic measures
of variance and skewness of the income processes. This is done separately for men and
women.
We divide the uncertainty into a permanent part relating to the variance of the indi-
vidual time-constant n and into a transitory uncertainty relating to the time-varying
error-term.4 Among the covariates in xnt we have included 28 educational dummies.5 We
dene an = exp (n) and ent = exp ("nt) and compute the variance R and the skewness
K for each education type l by
Rl =
1
Nl
PNl
n=1 (anl   al)2 Kl = 1Nl
PNl
n=1 (anl   al)3
R"l =
1
T
1
Nl
PNj
n=1 (enlt   el)2 K"l = 1T 1Nl
PNl
n=1 (enlt   el)3
By averaging the residuals only on education groups, we e¤ectively assume that the
income uncertainty does not depend on for example experience, which is obviously an
3The procedure is summarized in algorithm 1 in the appendix.
4Recently, Diaz-Serrano, Hartog, and Nielsen (2003) have used a similar approach in the context of
educational choice.
5In the IDA database there are 1,750 di¤erent educations, but in order to secure representativity
we operate with 28 education groups only (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). We have aimed at securing
representativity by not making a too disaggregated educational break-down, but on the other hand aimed
at selecting as homogeneous groups as possible.
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approximation. Averaging the incomes on other variables as well is not feasible with the
detailed education break-down used.
For an unemployed there is no or very little uncertainty regarding income. Conse-
quently, we set the variance and skewness equal to zero.
3.3. A Model of Occupational Choice. The behavioral framework underlying the
occupational choice model is simple: We assume that individuals each period associate
each occupation with a continuous random utility function, Unit , where each occupation is
indexed by i 2 [se; we; ue]. Each period individuals choose between self-employment (se),
wage-employment (we) and unemployment (ue) to maximize the Unit.6 Random utility is
assumed to be a linear function of occupational specic earnings, and the variance and
skewness of permanent and transitory income shocks. Hence, the random utility function
can be written as
Unit = xnit + i + nit with n = 1; :::; N and t = 1; ::; T
where i is a choice-specic constant, xnit =
h
Y^nit; R

l ; K

l ; R
"
l ; K
"
l
i
denotes the set of
attributes associated with each occupation,  is a vector of coe¢ cients related to the
the choice specic attributes xint. The error component nit is assumed to be individual-,
choice,- and time specic and distributed according to a Type I extreme value distribution.
With this distributional assumption, we end up with McFaddens well known Conditional
Logit model for discrete choices.
4. Results
4.1. Self-selection and Earnings Di¤erentials. In this section, we investigate the
extent to which earnings di¤erentials can be explained by individuals self-selecting them-
selves into the di¤erent occupations. To account for the potentially important selection
problems, we estimate the model sample selection model of Vella and Verbeek (1998,1999).
First, we estimate the selection equation given by equation (3.2) and equation (3.3) by a
6Even though each individual maximizes utility each period by choosing occupations this need not be
equivalent to maximization of life-time utility given by a discounted sum of period utility. However, this
simplication is needed to make the model operational.
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dynamic random e¤ects probit. Hereafter, we estimate the parameters in the conditional
earnings function in equation (3.1).
Since the choice of labor market state di¤ers considerably between the genders, the
sample correction and the prediction of incomes are done separately for men and women.
Additionally, the existence of wage di¤erentials between the genders suggests that it would
be appropriate to run the wage equations separately.
The results from the selection equations given in table A.2 suggest that the impact
of the lagged dependent variable is positive and highly signicant, indicating the pres-
ence of substantial state dependence. State dependence can be a result of cost of and
uncertainty of labor market transitions and is likely to be amplied for transitions into
self-employment in the presence of start-up costs. In an intertemporal model of occupa-
tional choice Schjerning (2005) shows that the combination of irreversible start-up costs
and income uncertainty introduces an option value of being self-employed. To avoid po-
tential start-up costs associated with later re-entry, the self-employed is willing to wait
until good times occur rather than temporarily leaving self-employment. This introduces
a value of waiting and consequently we will see later entry and later exit.
The magnitude of state dependence for the self-employed is substansial: Being self-
employed in the previous period increases the probability of being self-employed in the
current period from 1.2 to 41.5 per cent for females and from 4.0 per cent to 48.7 per cent
for men. As a comparison, the marginal e¤ect from previous wage-employment is 19.9
per cent for females and 24.0 per cent for men.
The results from the selection equation suggest that, in general, the probability of
being self-employed varies much between the educational categories both with respect to
length and type of education. Although the picture is quite mixed, it seems to be the
case that unskilled and some groups of highest education are the most likely to become
self-employed. The latter is due to the fact that the self-employed include professionals
such as practitioner doctors, dentists, lawyers and accountants.
The estimated earnings equations are given in table A.3. As dependent variable we use
the disposable income including retained earnings. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in the form of random e¤ects, and we control for the usual socio-demographic variables.
We nd positive coe¢ cients on marriage for men, while they are negative for women. The
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origin variables have the expected signs and magnitudes, i.e., non-western immigrants earn
considerably less than western immigrants, second generation immigrants and natives. It
is striking that non-western immigrants are more likely to become self-employed even
though they should expect a much lower income in self-employment compared to wage-
employment.
We nd the usual hump-shaped e¤ect of age, which obviously captures labor market
experience. We have included dummies for each education from our detailed educational
break-down shown in the appendix. The general picture is as expected that the longer
education, the higher disposable income. As one would presume, the returns to education
di¤er remarkably between the educations. For example, the returns to humanities are
lower compared to social sciences at each length of education reecting the relatively
higher unemployment rate that may lead to accepting jobs below the educational level.
If education is a signal, so that employers use education to screen potential workers,
we would expect lower returns to education in self-employment. There does not seem to
be much evidence for the signalling hypothesis.
Since we do not wish to rely on the non-linearity of the selection equation to identify the
selection e¤ects in the income equations we need to exclude at least one variable. We use
the lagged dependent variable, household wealth, dummies for children in the household
and a dummy for the spouse being self-employed.
The inclusion of the correction terms account for the selection bias induced by the
correlation between unobservables in the selection model and earnings equations. The
coe¢ cients to the correction terms nt and n are statistically signicant in all four re-
gressions. In the case of men, the coe¢ cient on both correction terms are negative,
implying that the marginalization on average dominates. Taken literally, we have that
those in wage-employment will tend to earn more in self-employment than those already
self-employed.
In contrast to this, the coe¢ cient on the individual specic correction term, n is
positive in the self-employment earnings equation for women implying that those in wage-
employment have a lower self-employment potential than the currently self-employed.
Since the income is measured on a yearly basis a possible explanation for the positive
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selection into self-employment relates to di¤erences in the hours of work between wage-
employed and self-employed. About 20 per cent of female wage-employed work part-time
and if this fraction is larger than the corresponding for women in self-selection a positive
selection into self-employment will, on average, emerge. In recent work by Carrasco and
Ejrnæs (2003) it is in fact argued that the relative low share of female self-employed
in Denmark can be explained by the relative high level of exibility in the Danish labor
market providing the possibility to work part time in paid employment. Similar arguments
apply to women planning to have children, as the opportunities for paid maternity leave
are better in wage-employment. Another explanation might be glass-ceiling e¤ects in
wage-employment, see e.g. Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman (2003) for Swedish evidence.
4.2. The Occupational Choice. The occupational choice model is estimated for a sev-
eral di¤erent subsamples. The results from these estimations are shown in Table 2. Each
row in the Table corresponds to the results for a di¤erent subsample. The gures in the
Table show the e¤ects of the mean, variance (uncertainty) and skewness (i.e., in this case
the chance of very high incomes) of predicted earnings conditional on the occupational
choice. Note that in the estimations, variance and skewness of both transitory and per-
manent shocks are included in the model. For expositional purposes, however, we only
report variance and skewness of the permanent income component in the Table.7
<< Table 2 about here >>
The coe¢ cients to mean earnings gives the marginal utility of expected income, while
the (negative of the) coe¢ cient to the variance can be interpreted as the marginal (dis-
) utility of income uncertainty. To give an example, a positive coe¢ cient to expected
income is associated with individuals consistently choosing occupations with higher levels
7Since the earnings equations were estimated with age variables and time-dummies there is no aggregate
time variation left in the error-terms, but still individual specic variation occurs. Alvarez, Browning, and
Ejrnæs (2002) nd that Danish income processes are particularly heterogenous. Steep income-experience
proles imply a large variance, but when controlling for the income level, we should due to income
smoothing expect that a at income-tenure prole is preferred. However, a steeper wage-experience
prole may indicate greater possibilities such as promotion for wage-employed and business expansion for
self-employed, which may explain the positice coe¢ cient to the variance of the temporary income shocks.
The skewness of the time-varying part does not seem to play any role.
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of expected earnings, while a negative coe¢ cient to variance emerges when individuals
choose occupations with little income uncertainty.
To make results comparable across di¤erent subsamples, we compute the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) between the variance and mean earnings and between the skewness
and mean earnings. The MRS can be interpreted as the rate at which you are willing to
trade o¤ more uncertainty for higher income.8 These results are shown in the right part
of the Table.
Considering the full sample (the rst row in the Table), the results point to a large
role for monetary aspects when choosing occupation. As expected, peoples choice of
occupation is positively a¤ected by expected (mean) earnings and negatively by a higher
variance of the income. Thus, on average, people appear risk averse. These ndings are
found to be robust to various sample decompositions.
Turning to the di¤erences between the genders, we nd that men put more emphasis
on the earnings level, while women appear more risk averse. This is reected in the much
lower value of the MRS estimate for women. This could be one of the main reasons why
fewer women choose to become self-employed.
Women seem to be behaving in a less risk averse manner when household wealth exceeds
DKK 500,000. This is perfectly consistent with standard models of intertemporal behavior
that nd that the degree of e¤ective risk aversion is decreasing in wealth; see, e.g., Deaton
(1991), Carroll (1997), and Schjerning (2005).
The nding that married women appear less risk averse than other women is also fully
consistent with models from the literature on family economics that point to risk sharing
as being a potentially important economic gain from marriage, see e.g. Hess (2004).
A similar variation in mens attitudes towards risk is not found. An interesting nding,
however, is that the MRS between income uncertainty and expected earnings is virtually
zero compared to females. This conrms the evidence fromDanish questionnaires, referred
to above, which pointed to men putting much more emphasis on monetary gains (expected
income) than women.
8This normalization is important since estimates from two di¤erent subsamples are not directly com-
parable due to di¤erences in the variances of the unobserved factors.
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Finally, a positive coe¢ cient to skewness is interpreted as being consistent with evi-
dence of overcondence. If people systematically prefer occupations with a high degree
of skewness (a chance of very high incomes) it may be due unrealistic, strong beliefs in
their own ability.
For the full sample, a negative coe¢ cient to skewness is found. Hence, on average,
there is no evidence of overcondence. The more detailed results with respect to this
behavioral hypothesis are mixed and inconclusive. If anything, men behave somewhat
more overcondently than females. This result match those found from experimental
studies.
It is striking that we in the model for immigrants only can explain 17 per cent compared
to 50 per cent in the other models. Moreover, the coe¢ cient to income is much lower than
in the other conditional logit models. Hence, other important (unobserved) factors, such
as lack of opportunities in the ordinary labor market and non-pecuniary benets may be
much more relevant in explaining their occupational choice. Hence, the low explanatory
power, and the lower coe¢ cient to income points to self-employment being the last resort
due to marginalization in wage-employment. We also nd that non-western immigrants
appear less risk averse. This may be due to marginalization forcing immigrants to accept
insecure and low paid occupations, but it can also be a consequence of cultural di¤erences
in the attitudes towards self-employment.
5. Conclusions
This paper uses high quality Danish longitudinal register data, to investigate the rela-
tionship between self-employment choice, expected earnings and income uncertainty. We
proceed in the following steps: Firstly, we estimate of conditional earnings functions using
the sample selection model of Vella and Verbeek (1998, 1999). Secondly, using measures
for expected income, uncertainty and skewness, we model the occupational choice in a
conditional logit model.
Comparing earnings distributions based on di¤erent income measures, we nd that i)
the dispersion of incomes is in general much larger for the self-employed and ii) Danish
self-employed earn more than wage-employed when retained earnings are included in the
income measure. Contrary to wage-workers, self-employed (taxable) personal income
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bunch at kink points in the tax system since self-employed (unlike wage workers) has the
possibility to retain earnings and thereby transfer income across years. The progressive
Danish income tax system provides strong incentives to make such transfers.
Several experimental studies have found that while men are more competitive, women
are more risk averse. In the context of occupational choice, we nd that men put more
emphasis on the income level, while women seem to be more risk-averse. This result is
found to be robust to various sample decompositions.
Linking the behavioral results from the experimental literature with income distribu-
tions in self-employment and wage-employment may explain why fewer women become
self-employed. We nd that part of the gender gap can be explained by gender di¤erences
in the trade-o¤s between income level and the variance of incomes. However, we nd no
e¤ect of skewness of incomes.
Non-western immigrants are overrepresented in self-employment. The occupational
choice model performs considerably worse for this group and we nd smaller e¤ects of
income level and variance. Furthermore, the sample selection model shows that non-
western are more likely to become self-employed even though they should expect a much
lower income in self-employment than native Danes. This suggests that non-western
immigrants are marginalized into self-employment.
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6. Appendix
Algorithm 1. Estimation of conditional error-term from the selection equation; E [ntjxnt; dn0; dnt]
(1) For a given set of parameter values 1 = (; ; ) take a draw from rn from
f (nj) = N (0; ) and calculate the likelihood for individual i conditional on
the draw
f (dn; di0jxn;rn) =
TnY
t=1
f (dntjxnt;rn) f (dn0jxnt;rn)
where f (dntjxnt;rn) = ntdnt+(1  nt) (1  dnt) and where nt   (xnt + dnt 1 + rn)
(2) Repeat many times and average the results to obtain the Simulated Log Likelihood
function (SLL)
SLL = ln
1
R
RX
r
f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
(3) Choose MSL1 so that SLL is maximized
(4) Given the MSL estimates from the st stage regression MSL1 , we can easily simu-
late ^nt: Take R draws from f
 
njMSL

and calculate the simulated counterpart
of ^nt
~nt =
1
1
R
PR
r f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
1
R
RX
r
(rn + E [ntjxn; rn]) f (dn; di0jxn;rn)
where E [ntjxn; rn] =
dntnt
nt
-
(1  dnt)nt
1  nt is the cross-sectional generalized resid-
ual for the probit model and where nt   (xnt + dnt 1 + rn)
To improve coverage of the integrals and reduce simulation noise, we use Halton Draws.9
.
9Halton draws provides a superior coverage as it induces negative correlation across individuals. In
the context of discrete choice models, Bhat (2001) found in a Mixed Logit Model, that 100 Halton
draws provided more precise results than 1000 standard pseudo random draw. Train (2003) provide a
comprehensive and excellent treatment of several variance reduction techniques.
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TABLE 1: INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS IN 1996, SELECTED PERCENTILES 
Self-empl. Wage-empl. Self-empl. Wage-empl.
5 0 111,055 -12,529 85,848
10 7,745 135,380 12,687 99,698
25 75,980 167,222 61,119 119,634
40 120,678 190,022 88,076 133,592
50 148,590 205,274 104,021 142,430
60 183,967 221,686 121,745 151,914
75 242,834 253,018 152,229 169,066
90 345,187 325,042 202,619 202,231
95 458,649 387,028 248,060 229,819
Disposable IncomePersonal IncomePercentile
 
 
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN 1996 
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FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME PLUS RETAINED EARNINGS 
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TABLE 2: CHOICE OF LABOR MARKET STATUS 
(CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODEL) 
Subsample Mean Earnings
Variance/
Mean
Skewnes/
Mean Sample size R2
All 1.58 (0.007)** -0.15 (0.004)** -0.02 (0.001)** -0.10 -0.010 7,274,082       51.
Non-western immigrants 1.08 (0.044)** 0.05 (0.025) -0.02 (0.005)** 0.04 -0.016 119,412          23.
Women 0.40 (0.017)** -0.22 (0.011)** -0.04 (0.001)** -0.56 -0.091 3,391,905       59.
Non-western immigrants 0.81 (0.095)** -0.34 (0.070)** 0.02 (0.009)* -0.42 0.022 45,564            29.
Married 1.00 (0.023)** -0.27 (0.014)** -0.03 (0.002)** -0.27 -0.032 2,514,129       61.
HH. Wealth(t-1)>500.000 0.85 (0.048)** -0.14 (0.022)** -0.01 (0.003)** -0.16 -0.013 493,101          64.
Father self-employed 1.29 (0.148)** 0.20 (0.030)** -0.06 (0.009)** 0.16 -0.043 64,728            64.
age<40 0.40 (0.026)** -0.11 (0.013)** -0.05 (0.002)** -0.27 -0.118 1,353,195       60.
age>45 0.58 (0.030)** -0.37 (0.025)** -0.02 (0.002)** -0.63 -0.038 1,148,580       57.
Men 2.81 (0.016)** -0.10 (0.005)** 0.00 (0.001) -0.04 -0.001 3,882,177       44.
Non-western immigrants 1.81 (0.088)** 0.14 (0.027)** -0.03 (0.006)** 0.08 -0.018 73,848            20.
Married 2.39 (0.020)** -0.15 (0.006)** 0.01 (0.001)** -0.06 0.003 2,761,398       48.
HH. Wealth(t-1)>500.000 1.42 (0.044)** -0.18 (0.012)** 0.06 (0.002)** -0.13 0.045 474,390          43.
Father self-employed 3.77 (0.110)** -0.10 (0.023)** -0.02 (0.007)** -0.03 -0.006 91,098            40.
age<40 3.33 (0.027)** -0.07 (0.007)** -0.02 (0.002)** -0.02 -0.006 1,538,208       50.
age>45 2.53 (0.027)** -0.10 (0.009)** 0.01 (0.002)** -0.04 0.004 1,348,191       39.
SkewnessVariance
Distribution of Permanent Chock's MRS
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Other controls: Occupational specific constants 
and measures of the temporary components of estimated chocks (skewness and variance) 
 
TABLE A.1: MEAN, VARIANCE AND SKEWNESS 
(EDUCATIONAL BREAKDOWN) 
se we se we se we se we se we se we
Missing education 3,867 29,167 209,691 163,169 35.633 0.049 2.196 0.224 47.9 11.8 6.1 3.9
Primary School Basic school 80,596 657,151 217,842 133,278 35.476 0.037 2.296 0.099 236.9 36.9 25.8 7.5
Secondary school General 4,509 43,962 267,294 166,541 0.660 0.039 3.216 0.223 25.5 2.1 6.9 3.6
Commercial and technical 1,362 12,906 353,176 218,601 1.062 0.100 6.970 0.806 11.9 20.8 6.9 13.1
Vocational training Shop assistents 24,343 345,545 232,634 151,299 2.342 0.034 0.974 0.122 104.9 9.8 5.3 6.2
Building and construction 18,769 113,541 225,676 170,977 0.571 0.024 0.554 0.072 28.6 5.1 7.5 4.4
Metal 17,887 147,347 240,837 177,130 0.219 0.028 0.784 0.075 11.2 19.9 5.7 4.5
Graphic 2,061 18,304 277,758 202,616 3.609 0.029 2.278 0.161 22.1 4.5 7.2 8.3
Technical 2,606 33,878 158,173 129,978 1.342 0.035 1.147 0.097 18.8 14.5 3.0 2.7
Service and transport 10,725 23,617 124,194 131,480 1.225 0.051 0.478 0.095 42.1 22.1 1.7 1.5
Food 20,383 49,809 314,211 170,244 1.155 0.032 0.764 0.091 83.8 5.1 5.3 4.7
Health care 2,254 67,273 138,455 117,762 0.659 0.026 0.896 0.052 14.2 5.2 3.3 1.2
Post secondary Humanities and social sciences 1,576 18,953 185,609 153,600 0.224 0.039 2.013 0.141 2.1 2.5 3.6 4.5
Technical 3,847 32,146 246,378 181,377 0.202 0.040 0.594 0.112 3.7 15.2 3.0 6.7
Agriculture 917 8,504 306,245 157,736 0.218 0.039 0.697 0.066 3.2 5.1 1.1 1.1
Health care 206 10,378 114,543 129,392 1.163 0.024 0.812 0.051 4.5 2.0 0.3 0.9
Police and defence 327 15,524 234,734 202,600 0.194 0.020 0.621 0.079 3.7 6.2 3.2 3.8
Higher education Humanities 3,033 157,352 174,274 156,319 7.537 0.021 0.893 0.054 48.4 2.6 3.1 1.5
short cycle Social sciences 1,780 22,332 491,580 251,898 0.251 0.073 1.292 0.270 3.2 15.7 2.5 3.8
Technical 3,338 40,915 308,715 246,404 0.483 0.041 1.327 0.126 17.3 8.7 8.4 10.5
Health care 1,962 65,014 168,011 137,621 0.095 0.026 0.659 0.057 2.0 2.7 4.8 4.7
Food, agriculture and transport 730 15,661 276,414 216,992 0.883 0.032 2.391 0.073 19.7 2.4 5.1 1.7
BA 469 5,205 336,057 251,710 0.828 0.087 1.234 0.320 8.4 11.9 1.5 2.4
Higher education Humanities 578 22,592 209,513 190,457 0.162 0.038 0.868 0.068 2.3 26.6 1.7 1.5
MA level Natural sciences 159 9,727 226,141 217,852 0.179 0.023 1.104 0.070 2.8 1.2 4.0 3.8
Social sciences 3,589 25,269 476,302 251,683 0.321 0.047 0.778 0.190 19.3 6.9 3.5 5.4
Technical 1,912 18,252 334,441 255,821 0.553 0.048 2.193 0.161 7.1 17.9 10.3 7.0
Food 1,431 5,250 358,845 228,455 0.122 0.024 0.446 0.073 5.8 2.1 7.6 2.4
Health care 7,069 18,412 441,567 260,069 0.074 0.038 0.199 0.085 2.4 13.1 3.0 1.3
# observations
Variance Skewness
Transitory effect Permanent effect Transitory effect Permanent effect
Mean disposable 
income
 
 
 
TABLE A.2: SELECTION EQUATIONS 
(RESULTS FROM A BINARY PROBIT WITH RANDOM EFFECTS) 
Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std.
Lagged dependent, y(t-1) 2.590 0.007 1.415 0.004 2.651 0.010 1.226 0.005
Initial dependent, y(0) 1.962 0.018 1.918 0.010 1.641 0.023 1.540 0.011
Age 0.705 0.071 -0.157 0.044 0.731 0.096 0.974 0.047
Age squared -0.827 0.082 0.067 0.050 -0.822 0.110 -1.231 0.053
Wealth (in mio dkr, 1996 prices) 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.001
No. of children aged 0-6 0.049 0.006 -0.019 0.004 0.049 0.010 -0.098 0.006
No. of children aged 7-17 0.030 0.004 -0.011 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.001 0.003
Married -0.006 0.009 0.112 0.007 -0.047 0.011 0.064 0.007
Immigrant (western) 0.043 0.030 -0.155 0.023 0.132 0.032 -0.159 0.021
Immigrant (non-western) 0.230 0.028 -0.481 0.020 0.124 0.037 -0.529 0.024
Second generation immigrants 0.092 0.084 -0.111 0.070 0.132 0.109 0.037 0.079
Spouse self-employed 0.453 0.013 0.137 0.005 0.399 0.011 0.152 0.005
Regional Copenhagen 0.009 0.017 -0.131 0.012 0.033 0.022 -0.097 0.013
 dummies Large city 0.012 0.016 -0.096 0.012 0.022 0.020 -0.161 0.012
Rural 0.097 0.013 -0.123 0.009 0.120 0.015 -0.197 0.009
Missing education 0.066 0.029 -0.030 0.023 0.152 0.037 -0.109 0.025
Secondary General 0.061 0.026 0.073 0.020 0.133 0.034 0.093 0.022
school Commercial and technical 0.070 0.043 0.153 0.038 0.002 0.070 0.190 0.042
Vocational Shop assistents -0.038 0.014 0.176 0.012 -0.023 0.013 0.155 0.008
training Building and construction -0.025 0.014 0.067 0.011 0.180 0.084 -0.011 0.067
Metal -0.072 0.014 0.152 0.011 0.403 0.139 0.063 0.103
Graphic -0.025 0.036 0.041 0.028 0.252 0.082 -0.182 0.055
Technical -0.010 0.046 0.087 0.033 0.071 0.029 0.000 0.019
Service and transport 0.188 0.041 -0.145 0.032 0.500 0.025 -0.370 0.020
Food 0.175 0.018 -0.156 0.015 0.110 0.057 0.051 0.037
Health care -0.143 0.086 0.418 0.066 -0.099 0.022 0.351 0.013
Post Humanities and social sciences 0.171 0.069 0.007 0.059 0.176 0.036 0.063 0.023
secondary Technical -0.056 0.026 0.191 0.021 0.057 0.054 0.223 0.035
Agriculture -0.050 0.060 0.126 0.047 -0.172 0.084 0.439 0.054
Health care -0.751 0.361 0.478 0.153 -0.204 0.064 0.443 0.038
Police and defence -0.425 0.053 0.763 0.039 -0.422 0.322 0.532 0.122
Higher Humanities -0.365 0.026 0.587 0.018 -0.221 0.019 0.552 0.012
education Social sciences 0.003 0.035 0.256 0.029 -0.097 0.057 0.418 0.037
short cycle Technical -0.048 0.024 0.302 0.019 0.139 0.118 0.073 0.078
Health care 0.153 0.077 0.285 0.065 -0.177 0.024 0.785 0.016
Food, agriculture and transportati -0.258 0.043 0.478 0.033 -0.095 0.114 0.277 0.073
BA 0.043 0.067 0.170 0.054 -0.238 0.189 0.324 0.094
Higher Humanities -0.358 0.047 0.510 0.032 -0.044 0.055 0.297 0.032
education Natural sciences -0.390 0.069 0.616 0.051 -0.221 0.122 0.352 0.065
MA level Social sciences 0.198 0.029 0.073 0.023 0.195 0.051 0.218 0.034
Technical 0.021 0.033 0.264 0.027 0.112 0.101 0.110 0.072
Food 0.223 0.053 0.034 0.042 0.395 0.094 -0.008 0.062
Health care 0.587 0.031 -0.333 0.027 0.563 0.039 0.048 0.029
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -4.327 0.153 -0.661 0.098 -4.627 0.208 -2.555 0.104
σ µ 0.760 0.009 0.838 0.005 0.626 0.011 0.730 0.005
Number of observations 1288888 1288888 1126960 1126960
Number of individuals 136990 136990 122749 122749
Log-likelihood -116985.808 -287641.544 -59297.355 -243222.453
Males Females
Self-employment Wage-employment Self-employment Wage-employment
 
 
TABLE A.3: EARNINGS EQUATIONS 
(CORRECTED FOR SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS AND UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY) 
Coefficient Std.Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std.Coefficient Std.
Age (divided by 10) 0.707 0.030 0.323 0.004 0.282 0.081 0.069 0.005
Age squared (divided by 1000) -0.834 0.034 -0.350 0.005 -0.410 0.092 -0.111 0.005
Married 0.110 0.006 0.063 0.001 -0.285 0.015 -0.101 0.001
Immigrant (western) -0.278 0.031 -0.081 0.006 -0.264 0.062 -0.046 0.006
Immigrant (non-western) -0.608 0.029 -0.187 0.006 -0.543 0.071 -0.065 0.008
Second generation immigrants 0.008 0.086 -0.027 0.014 -0.098 0.230 0.009 0.018
Regional Copenhagen -0.239 0.015 -0.085 0.002 -0.141 0.034 -0.044 0.002
dummies Large city 0.019 0.016 -0.039 0.002 -0.033 0.036 -0.062 0.002
Rural 0.041 0.012 0.014 0.002 -0.072 0.027 -0.042 0.002
Missing education -0.068 0.031 0.086 0.006 -0.098 0.072 0.063 0.007
SecondaryGeneral 0.079 0.029 0.017 0.005 0.093 0.062 0.009 0.005
school Commercial and technical 0.258 0.047 0.238 0.009 -0.056 0.131 0.114 0.010
VocationalShop assistents 0.196 0.016 0.185 0.003 0.107 0.029 0.093 0.002
training Building and construction 0.025 0.015 0.066 0.003 -0.152 0.194 0.052 0.017
Metal 0.071 0.015 0.087 0.003 0.175 0.288 0.101 0.027
Graphic 0.148 0.041 0.223 0.007 0.276 0.172 0.171 0.017
Technical 0.038 0.051 0.042 0.009 -0.113 0.061 0.036 0.005
Service and transport 0.002 0.036 0.084 0.009 -0.013 0.038 -0.028 0.007
Food 0.319 0.016 0.085 0.004 0.182 0.099 0.051 0.008
Health care 0.144 0.112 0.043 0.012 0.049 0.051 0.039 0.003
Post Humanities and social sciences 0.086 0.072 0.209 0.013 0.219 0.067 0.189 0.006
secondary Technical 0.139 0.030 0.178 0.005 0.098 0.121 0.073 0.009
Agriculture 0.316 0.064 0.218 0.013 0.071 0.171 0.135 0.013
Health care 0.141 0.452 -0.021 0.027 -0.044 0.149 0.113 0.009
Police and defence 0.242 0.076 0.208 0.007 0.215 0.755 0.086 0.022
Higher Humanities 0.133 0.040 0.189 0.004 0.122 0.052 0.224 0.003
education Social sciences 0.660 0.041 0.426 0.006 0.443 0.151 0.276 0.008
short cycleTechnical 0.300 0.029 0.401 0.005 0.324 0.207 0.385 0.020
Health care 0.279 0.097 0.180 0.014 0.468 0.058 0.219 0.004
Food, agriculture and transport 0.181 0.061 0.341 0.008 0.299 0.255 0.191 0.017
BA 0.127 0.068 0.314 0.011 0.484 0.313 0.163 0.015
Higher Humanities 0.233 0.080 0.336 0.007 0.247 0.109 0.445 0.007
education Natural sciences 0.354 0.114 0.387 0.009 -0.066 0.378 0.476 0.015
MA level Social sciences 0.773 0.034 0.486 0.006 0.719 0.109 0.476 0.007
Technical 0.376 0.039 0.477 0.007 0.564 0.198 0.435 0.020
Food 0.634 0.054 0.428 0.013 0.613 0.200 0.420 0.023
Health care 0.959 0.028 0.663 0.008 1.257 0.069 0.627 0.010
σ αµ -0.062 0.003 -0.112 0.001 -0.024 0.005 -0.076 0.002
σ εη -0.012 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.092 0.008 0.013 0.001
Constant 15.109 0.068 15.783 0.010 15.779 0.180 16.323 0.011
Number of observations
Number of individuals
σ α
σ ε
Fraction of variance due to 
individual specific error
R-squared 0.230.12 0.20 0.11
Males Females
Self-employment Wage-employment Self-employment Wage-employment
Summary Statistics
168782 1037089 47496 994058
27544 122754 10456 117511
0.6656 0.2929 0.9831 0.3092
0.4557 0.1737 0.5914 0.1869
0.68 0.74 0.73 0.73
 
 
